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Abstract: This article studies some institutional trends in international financial 
regulation after the great crisis of 2008. It supports the idea that the largest 
financial corporations are working to create several components for an 
international self-regulation. Private firms make up the architecture of this 
complicated global mechanism, which is backed up by governments. Meanwhile, 
this built-up mechanism is based on several assumptions about the origins of the 
great financial crisis and on the capabilities of governments to reach the objectives 
they are expected to achieve. This article concludes that a new financial crisis will 
develop, and the “too-big-to-fail” financial corporations are already preparing 
strategies on resolution regimes.  
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The great crisis that began between 2007 and 2008 changed the financial markets. 
Even though the structured finance model went bankrupt and the profitability of 
business around credit securitization became fragile, the business of financial markets 
continues to be supported by structured finance. Almost a decade after the outbreak 
of the crisis, financial markets are fragile, and it is difficult to see stable perspectives in 
the near future. Successive episodes of financial crises have emerged, including 
financial instruments, currencies, or commodities. All of them are linked more to 
credit behavior and less to the conditions of each country or the demand for goods. 
Such is the case of the crises in Greece, Spain, Portugal, the food crisis, and the 
energy crisis.  
The financial crisis of 2008 has been global, extensive, and heterogeneous. It has 
also been characteristically opaque, leaving many governments with very limited 
abilities to contain it. The roads taken for its management — mainly by private 
corporations — have resulted in new instruments and institution. The latter are 
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created in the framework of central banks and domestic supervision authorities, but 
also through the Bank for International Settlements (BIP) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Yet, the main financial actors and managers in the crisis have 
been the same global banks. Indeed, these global financial corporations were the 
largest contributors to the crisis. However, they are also the main participants in the 
creation of new rules and institutional frameworks for their (own) rescue in another 
crisis in the future. The return to profitable business has been piecemeal — based on 
segments, regions, and markets. It is taking new dimensions in conglomerates and 
markets. Financialization has built up strong and deeply efficient networks for 
transferring profits and losses that are useful for concentrating income. It has also 
been effective in controlling losses. The Great Recession has exposed the enormous 
difficulties that state and/or private management systems face as they work with 
limited information in very opaque market operations and in conditions of shadow 
banking’s portfolios, where the opacity of global banks and all financial institutions 
dominates, in spite of the rating agencies. 
Using this framework, we track the path of financial markets by reviewing 
several main trends: (i) special agreements on financial information disclosure; (ii) 
weakening of government regulations due to private bargaining and supervision 
agreements; (iii) revision of lender-of-last-resort mechanisms and central banks 
functions; (iv) global coordination of national treasuries for the redistribution of 
regional assets, firms, and operations; (v) new constraints on shadow banking; and (vi) 
growing speculation on land and infrastructure.  
We argue that, by analyzing the above path, we could uncover useful knowledge 
about what the financial crisis left behind. We also posit that the same trends which 
led to the Great Recession are continuing.   
 
Are We Aiming for Just Market Governance? 
 
Since the 1970s, state regulation of markets and financial firms has been consistently 
weakened, opening the door to new competition, but mostly to deal-making and 
collusions between corporations. For example, since the 1980s, loan contracts 
between banks and developing countries have clauses mandating that all dispute 
resolutions would take place in New York courts. One recent outcome, resulting from 
this regulation, was the vultures’ funds — led by Paul Singer — imposing their 
decisions over Argentina’s bonds sovereignty. 
Consecutive financial crises entail cyclical commitments for private firms to 
improve institutions and market rules. But as soon as the main pressure from a crisis 
eases, commitments to negotiate new agreements get diluted. The 2008 crisis appears 
to be the result of market regulations, but it is the deregulation that preceded it 
(Correa 1998). The last mechanism of financial concertation for regulation and 
supervision was developed by the G20. For example, in 2009, the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) was created (Kirton 2013). The FSB was preceded by the 1999 G7’s 
Financial Stability Forum that was formed in the wake of the big East Asia’s credit 
crunch (Porter 2000). 




Among the first obstacles identified by governments and state authorities while 
trying to stop the crisis were precisely the lack and quality of information. Added to 
this was the international admixture of laws on bankruptcy and resolution, 
fundamental concepts and methodologies for assessing the health of banks, and the 
conditions of liquidity and risks in the markets. These are the lines where the FSB has 
advanced the most. 
The FSB has worked hard on data collection and analysis, as well as on the 
construction of regulation proposals, bringing together the major financial actors in 
the global market. These actors must accept the regulations. In the lobbying process 
for global-national regulations, states have lost much of their sovereignity. At the same 
time, the most important government positions are occupied by former executives of 
financial conglomerates. In addition, the crisis has opened space for relaxing both 
regulation and the commitment to new rules.  
Financial institutions that are the main target of this new regulation mechanism 
include global, systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and insurance companies (G-
SIIs). But reforms in shadow banking, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, and “too-
big-to-fail” policies have not really moved forward (FSB 2016). Even if the direction of 
regulation reforms is positive, it either moves very slowly or not at all. The FSB Report 
(FSB 2016, 1) highlights this trend: “Implementation progress remains steady but 
uneven across the four core areas of the reform program … [S]ome major advanced 
economies have not addressed deviations in their rules from the Basel framework.”  
Proposals to end the “too-big-to-fail” problem have taken the approach of 
building resolution regimes for the global systemically important banks and insurance 
companies. Even if the resolution regimes were completed, they would still have to be 
tested. Another global crisis would result in a credit crunch and liquidity demands on 
treasuries. Right now “substantial work remains [to be done in order to] to build 
effective resolution regimes and to operationalize resolution plans for cross-border 
firms” (FSB 2016, 1). The same can be said of both the OTC market and shadow 
banking.  
All these processes have been consulted and agreed upon by the largest global 
financial actors. For example, the documents for “Proposed Policy Recommendations 
to Address Structural Vulnerabilities from Asset Management Activities” were 
accepted by several well-known financial actors, such as Axa Investment Management, 
BlackRock, Deutsche Bank, Fidelity, State Street, and Vanguard. 
International agreements are another type of financial regulation designed by 
financial actors. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD 2015) reports over 2,600 international treaties being signed between 1990 
and 2007, many of which have clauses that create a “spaghetti bowl” of 
interconnected agreements.  This interconnection places the support for the local 
liquidity demands on domestic treasuries. In the case of extraordinary liquidity 
requirements of headquarter banks, these interconnections support central banks. 
They are restructuring the role of central banks, not only because the latter were 
incapable of funding the demand liquidity, but also because national treasuries would 
support funding subsidiaries to major global banks.  
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Almost all international treaties signed after NAFTA (1992) include an investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) clause in their contracts with governments, which 
allows investors to sue governments for redress of losses. These treaties commit 
signatory governments and their budgets (and contributors) to private contracts that a 
nation’s citizenry did not sign.  
 
How Much Has Happened? 
 
The great crisis of 2008 emerged precisely from the heart of the global financial world. 
However, the deep interconnection of markets, built to decentralize risks and 
concentrate profitability, spread the crisis globally. As the prices of raw materials and 
energy grew quickly, international prices began to rise, too. Very early trends of slow 
growth and even stagnation were present, and high levels of speculation in these 
products as underlying assets of different securities led to a huge drop in prices of the 
most important exports of developing economies. The great crisis depressed 
economies worldwide, following a path of slow growth and stagnation (BIS 2015; IMF 
2016). Austerity policies have prevented any possible exit that implies a market 
expansion through the increase in consumption and investment.  
Some figures that illustrate this global stagnation include the global per capita 
product, which rose from $5,100 to $5,900 (in constant 2005 prices) between 2007 
and 2014. Foreign direct investment reached $3 trillion in 2007, falling to $ 1.6 
trillion in 2014. World merchandise exports amounted to $16 trillion both in 2007 
and in 2015. The total global employed population barely increased by 200,000 
people from 2007 to 2015, as the working population declined in relation to the total 
population. Domestic credit to the private sector in the same period rose from 129 to 
137 percent of GDP (World Bank 2016). In the post-crisis years, there has been a 
trend toward global stagnation of real wages, especially in developed economies as 
well as in Latin America (ILO 2014). 
These trends — as well as governments’ reactions to them — have created very 
different business modalities in each of the states where they have been implemented. 
For example, in its 2016 list, Forbes features public companies from 63 countries that, 
together, amassed $35 trillion in revenue, $2.4 trillion in profit, $162 trillion in 
assets, and have a combined market value of $44 trillion (Forbes 2016a). More than 
three hundred sites, or 15 percent of the two thousand listed companies, are global 
banks and financial institutions. Among the largest banks, nine are from China; four 
from the US; Canada, Japan, and Australia each have two banks; and the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands have one bank each. 
Germany does not have a bank ranked in the top twenty-five. Commerzbank, the 
highest-ranking German bank, occupies 62nd place and Deutsche Bank takes 76th 
place among banks (Forbes 2016b). 
These deep economic interrelations among the largest companies have been 
documented by Stefania Vitali, James Glattfelder, and Stefano Battiston (2011). These 
authors study 47,000 publically listed companies, based on 2007 data: 
 




We find that, despite its small size, the core holds collectively a large 
fraction of the total network control. In detail, nearly 4/10 of the control 
over the economic value of TNCs in the world is held, via a complicated 
network of ownership relations, by a group of 147 TNCs in the core, 
which have almost full control over itself. The top holders within the core 
can thus be thought of as an economic “super-entity” in the global network 
of corporations. A relevant additional fact at this point is that 3/4 of the 
core are financial intermediaries. (Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston 2011, 6) 
 
The largest global financial actors have changed positions in the ten-year post-
crisis period. The most notable change was seen in Chinese banks. The assets of 
Chinese financial institutions grew from four to almost forty trillion dollars between 
2002 and 2014. But it has also been the case of Brazil, whose assets also increased 
from 0.4 to 4.8 trillion dollars. Australia’s financial institutions’ assets grew from 1.3 
to 5.6 trillion dollars, as well as those of Canada’s — from 2.4 to 5.9 trillion dollars.  
In the same sense, institutional investors have changed, too. Investment funds 
with remarkable growth were located in Luxemburg, Canada, and the United States 
(note that the OECD does not present data from China and the United Kingdom). 
At the same time, the assets of insurance corporations and pension funds have not 
seen the same spectacular growth after falling in 2008–2009 (OECD 2015).  
Bank return on equity has not come back to its pre-crisis level in Europe and 
North America, although it has happened for Asia-Pacific banks (IMF 2016). 
Moreover, shadow banking continues to grow in the UK, but not as much in the US 
and in the Euro-area countries. The IMF (2016) reports that shadow banking 
represents 180 percent of banking assets in the US. In the UK, shadow banking is 
equivalent to 350 percent of GDP, and in the Euro-area and the US — almost 200 
percent of GDP. The shadow banking’s lending constitutes more than 50 percent of 
private credit, accounting for almost 30 percent in the Euro-area.  
One of the most remarkable post-crisis financial processes has been the 
tremendous growth of agricultural property prices. These have increased further than 
the prices of commodities and, in recent years, even further than gold prices. These 
price increase was especially notable in Central Europe and Latin America (Savills 




The 2008 crisis — as well as the post-crisis processes — revealed the high level of 
addiction of financial markets to securitization growth. The return to profit by 
financial markets is going hand in hand with emerging new developments, including: 
financial instruments; privatization of state-owned assets; large agriculture and mineral 
land sales as underlying assets of financial instruments; and new borrowers in the 
process of deepening banking services. This explains the renewed interest of financial 
and non-financial corporations in developing economies. As financial profits fell in 
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the few years after the financial crisis, the profitability of all economic sectors remains 
lower and even the most dynamic markets are not enough to support strong economic 
growth in many countries. Austerity policies continue to be the determining factor in 
maintaining economic stagnation. 
The utopia of creating formulas for international government — one that is able 
to resolve differences in markets and competition, as well as provide rules for general 
compliance — causes corporations to be driven by advancing economic 
transformations. While it may be possible to curb some of the most pernicious effects 
of financial crises by selling organized corporations too big to be rescued, it does not 
mean that many other issues of global competition are not still falling short of 
governance and stability. In turn, this has generated concentration, marginalization, 
poverty, and increasing expropriation of people’s livelihood by putting their very 
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